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Abstract
The secrecy capacity region for the K-receiver degraded broadcast channel (BC) is given for confidential messages
sent to the receivers and to be kept secret from an external wiretapper. Superposition coding and Wyner’s random
code partitioning are used to show the achievable rate tuples. Error probability analysis and equivocation calculation
are also provided. In the converse proof, a new definition for the auxiliary random variables is used, which is different
from either the case of the 2-receiver BC without common message or the K-receiver BC with common message,
both with an external wiretapper; or the K-receiver BC without a wiretapper.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wireless communications channel is vulnerable to eavesdropping or wiretapping due to the open nature
of the channel. An important requirement for wireless systems today is the characterization of transmission rates
that allow for both secure and reliable communication for the physical layer. Recent studies addressing this issue
have included wireless network building blocks such as the multiple-access channels [1], relay channels [2], fading
channels [3], [4] and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels [5].
A suitable model for studying such simultaneously secure and reliable communication in the wireless broadcast
and communications medium is the broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages, which was studied by
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [6]. It is a generalization of the characterization of the wiretap channel by Wyner [7]. In the
model of [6], there are 2 receivers and a common message is sent to both, while a confidential message is sent
to one of the receivers and is to be kept secret from the other receiver. The secrecy level is determined by using
the equivocation rate, which is the entropy rate of the confidential message conditioned on the channel output at
the eavesdropper or wiretapper. The secrecy capacity region is the set of transmission rates where the legitimate
receiver decodes its confidential message while keeping the message secret from the wiretapper.
In more recent studies on the BC with confidential messages, Liu et al. [8] investigated the scenario where there
are 2 receivers and private messages are sent to each one and kept secret from the unintended receiver; Xu et al.
[9] studied the case in [8] but with a common message to both receivers; Bagherikaram et al. [10] addressed the
scenario where there are 2 receivers and one wiretapper, with confidential messages sent to the receivers.
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2In this paper, we investigate the degraded K-receiver BC with confidential messages sent to each receiver in the
presence of a wiretapper, from which the messages are kept secret. Our results are a generalization of our work
for 3 receivers in [11] and earlier results for 2 receivers in [10]. It is noted that results similar to ours have been
established independently in [12], where Ekrem and Ulukus [12] examined the K-receiver degraded BC and one
wiretapper with confidential messages as well as a common message sent to the receivers. However, there are some
appreciable differences between our approach and that in [12]. In particular, equivocation calculation and proof of
the converse in [12] are accomplished from the perspective of the channel sum rate. In contrast, we provide the
error probability analysis and the equivocation calculation with respect to the kth receiver’s achievable rate. Further,
we use Wyner’s method of random code partitioning instead of Gel’fand-Pinsker binning which is used in [10] to
perform code partitioning to achieve perfect secrecy. In our proof of the converse, which we have shown for the
kth receiver, we note that our choice of auxiliary random variables is different from that of [10] and [12]. Due to
the presence of the wiretapper, it is also different from the choice in Borade et al. [13] where the capacity region
for the degraded K-receiver BC using superposition coding without confidential messages is studied.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the general K-receiver degraded
BC with confidential messages. In Section III, we state our main result for the secrecy capacity for the degraded
K-receiver BC with wiretapper and show the proof of achievability and equivocation calculation in Sections III-A
and III-B, respectively. In Section IV, we show the converse proof. Lastly we give conclusions in Section V.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
In this paper, we use the uppercase letter to denote a random variable (e.g., X) and the lowercase letter for
its realization (e.g., x). The alphabet set of X is denoted by X so that x ∈ X . We can also have a sequence of
n random variables, denoted by X = (X1, . . . , Xn) with its realization x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn if xi ∈ X for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Furthermore, we define the subsequences of X as Xi , (X1, X2, . . . , Xi) and X˜i , (Xi, . . . , Xn).
The discrete memoryless K-receiver BC with an external wiretapper consists of a finite input alphabet X and finite
output alphabets Y1, . . . ,YK ,Z and has conditional distribution p(y1, . . . , yK , z|x). Thus the discrete memoryless
BC with K receivers and a wiretapper has an input random sequence X, K output random sequences, Y1, . . . ,YK ,
at the intended receivers, and an output random sequence at the wiretapper Z. Likewise, we have y1 ∈ Yn1 , . . . ,
yK ∈ Y
n
K and z ∈ Zn. The conditional distribution for n uses of the channel is
p(y1, . . . ,yK , z|x) =
n∏
i=1
p(y1i, . . . , yKi, zi|xi). (1)
The transmitter has to send independent messages (W1, . . . ,WK) to the receivers in perfect secrecy. This is done
using a (2nR1 , . . . , 2nRK , n)-code for the BC, which consists of the stochastic encoder
f :
{
1, . . . , 2nR1
}
×
{
1, . . . , 2nR2
}
× · · · ×
{
1, . . . , 2nRK
}
7→ Xn, (2)
and the decoders
gk : Y
n
k 7→
{
1, . . . , 2nRk
}
, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. (3)
3The probability of error is defined as the probability that the decoded messages are not equal to the transmitted
messages, i.e.,
P (n)e , Pr
{
K⋃
k=1
{gk(Yk) 6= Wk}
}
. (4)
Perfect secrecy requires that the mutual information of the transmitted messages and the wiretapper goes to zero.
Let us illustrate this for message W1 and receiver 1. The perfect secrecy requirement is
I(W1;Z) = 0 ⇒ H(W1) = H(W1|Z), (5)
where I(·; ·) denotes mutual information and H(·) is entropy. Now, let the information rate for the first receiver be
R1 =
1
n
H(W1) and the equivocation rate be Re(1) , 1nH(W1|Z). Then, we need
Re(1) ≥ R1 − η, for any arbitrary η > 0. (6)
Further to this, we define the following equivocation rates for the K-receiver degraded BC:

Re(k) ,
1
n
H(Wk|Z), for k = 1, . . . ,K,
Re(k,k+1) ,
1
n
H(Wk,Wk+1|Z), for k = 1, . . . ,K,
Re(1,...,K) ,
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z).
(7)
III. THE SECRECY CAPACITY REGION
The secret rate tuple (R1, R2, . . . , RK) is achievable if for any arbitrarily small ǫ′ > 0, ǫk > 0, k = 1, . . . ,K ,
ǫk,k+1 > 0, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1, and ǫ1,...,K > 0, there exist (2nR1 , . . . , 2nRK , n)-codes for which P (n)e ≤ ǫ′ and

Re(k) ≥ Rk − ǫk, for k = 1, . . . ,K,
Re(k,k+1) ≥ Rk +Rk+1 − ǫk,k+1, for k = 1, . . . ,K,
Re(1,...,K) ≥
K∑
k=1
Rk − ǫ1,...,K .
(8)
(8) gives the security conditions for the K-receiver BC with a wiretapper under perfect secrecy requirements in (6).
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity region for the K-receiver degraded BC with an external wiretapper is the
closure of all rate tuples (R1, . . . , RK) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U2)− I(X ;Z|U2), (9a)
Rk ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk+1)− I(Uk;Z|Uk+1), for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1, (9b)
RK ≤ I(UK ;YK)− I(UK ;Z), (9c)
where {Uk}Kk=2 are auxiliary random variables and will be defined in Section III-A (Random codebook generation).
Proof: The proof of achievability and equivocation calculation are given later in this section. The proof of
converse is given separately in Section IV.
If we use superposition coding with code partitioning to achieve the rates in Theorem 1, then the secrecy capacity
region may be interpreted as the capacity region for the K-receiver BC using superposition coding without the
4wiretapper, with the rates at each receiver each reduced due to the presence of the wiretapper. However, we shall see
that the choice of auxiliary random variables in the proof of converse for the K-receiver BC will be different from
that of [13], which is without the secrecy conditions. This is also in contrast to the 2-receiver BC with wiretapper
in [10], where the same definition for the auxiliary random variables in the converse proof can be used for the
scenarios with and without the secrecy conditions.
A. Proof of Achievability
In this paper, we employ superposition coding and Wyner’s random code partitioning to show the achievable rate
tuples (R1, . . . , RK). For brevity, we use pY1|X to denote the channel from X to Y1, similarly for the channels
from X to outputs Y2, . . . ,YK and Z, by pY2|X, . . . , pYK |X and pZ|X, respectively.
The coding strategy is depicted in Fig. 1. The message Wk ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} with Lk , 2nRk for k = 1, . . . ,K , is
sent by a code of length Nk = LkL′k. This code is partitioned into Lk subcodes each of size L′k, with L′k , 2nR
′
k
for some R′k. Each of the Lk subcodes is a code for the wiretapper pZ|X, while each of the entire codes of size
Nk is a code simultaneously for both the kth receiver pYk|X and the wiretapper pZ|X. The codes for simultaneous
use for pYk|X and pZ|X have to satisfy the transmission requirements for the BC [14], so that
1
n
logN1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U2), (10a)
1
n
logNk ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk+1), for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1, (10b)
1
n
logNK ≤ I(UK ;YK). (10c)
1) Random codebook generation:
Suppose that we have the probability density functions (p.d.f.s)

p(uK),
p(uk|uk+1, . . . , uK), for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1,
p(x|u2, . . . , uK).
(11)
For a given rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK , R′1, . . . , R′K), in order to send message WK , generate 2n(RK+R
′
K) inde-
pendent codewords uK(w′′K), for w′′K ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(RK+R
′
K)} according to the p.d.f. p(uK) =
∏n
i=1 p(uKi).
Then, partition uK(w′′K) into LK = 2nRK subcodes, {C
(K)
i }
LK
i=1 with |C
(K)
i | = L
′
K = 2
nR′K ∀i.
The message for the kth receiver, for k = 2, 3, . . . ,K − 1, is sent by generating 2n(Rk+R′k) independent
codewords uk(w′′k , . . . , w′′K), for w′′k ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(Rk+R
′
k)} according to the conditional p.d.f.
p(uk|uk+1, . . . ,uK) =
n∏
i=1
p(uki|u(k+1)i, . . . , uKi). (12)
Then, partition uk(w′′k , . . . , w′′K) into Lk = 2nRk subcodes, {C
(k)
i }
Lk
i=1, with |C
(k)
i | = L
′
k = 2
nR′k ∀i. Finally, to
send the message intended for the first receiver, generate 2n(R1+R′1) independent codewords x(w′′1 , . . . , w′′K),
for w′′1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(R1+R
′
1)} according to the p.d.f. p(x|u2, . . . ,uK) =
∏n
i=1 p(x|u2i, . . . , uKi). Then,
partition x(w′′1 , . . . , w′′K) into L1 = 2nR1 subcodes, {C
(1)
i }
L1
i=1, with |C
(1)
i | = L
′
1 = 2
nR′1 ∀i.
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Fig. 1. Coding for K receiver BC with wiretapper.
Following this code structure, the codeword indices w′′k may be expressed as w′′k = (wk, w′k), where wk ∈
{1, . . . , 2nRk} is the index of the message transmitted to the kth receiver, and w′k ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR
′
k} denotes the
index of the codeword within the subcodes C(k)i , selected for transmission along with wk to ensure secrecy.
2) Encoding:
The encoding is by superposition coding. To send the message wK = iK , for 1 ≤ iK ≤ LK , the transmitter
chooses one of the uK(w′′K) codewords uniformly and randomly from {C
(K)
iK
}LKiK=1. Then, to send the message
wK−1 = iK−1, for 1 ≤ iK−1 ≤ LK−1, the transmitter selects one of the uK−1(w′′K−1, w′′K) uniformly
randomly from {C(K−1)iK−1 }
LK−1
iK−1=1
, given uK(w′′K). Sequentially, the transmitter sends the message wk = ik,
for 1 ≤ ik ≤ Lk and k = 2, . . . ,K−2, to the kth receiver by choosing one of the uk(w′′k , . . . , w′′K) uniformly
and randomly from {C(k)ik }
Lk
ik=1
, given uk+1(w′′k+1, . . . , w′′K). Lastly, to send w1 = i1 for 1 ≤ i1 ≤ L1, given
u2(w
′′
2 , . . . , w
′′
K), the transmitter chooses one of the x(w′′1 , . . . , w′′K) uniformly randomly from {C
(1)
i1
}L1i1=1.
3) Decoding:
We use the notation Anǫ (PV ) to denote the set of jointly typical n-sequences with respect to the p.d.f. p(v).
Also, we use {wˆk}Kk=1 to denote the estimates for the transmitted messages {wk}Kk=1. Then, we have:
a) At the Kth receiver, given that yK is received, find a wˆK , such that (uK(wˆK , w′K),yK) ∈ Anǫ (PUKYK ).
b) At the kth receiver, for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1, given that yk is received, find a (wˆk, . . . , wˆK) such that
(uK(wˆk, w
′
k), . . . ,uk(wˆk, w
′
k, . . . , wˆK , w
′
K),yk) ∈ A
n
ǫ (PUKUK−1···UkYk). (13)
6c) Lastly, at the first receiver, given that y1 is received, find a (wˆ1, . . . , wˆK) such that
(uK(wˆK , w
′
K), . . . ,u2(wˆ2, w
′
2, . . . , wˆK , w
′
K),x1(wˆ1, w
′
1, . . . , wˆK , w
′
K),y1) ∈ A
n
ǫ (PUKUK−1···U2XY1).
(14)
For each of the above cases, if there is none or more than one possible decoded message, then an error will
be declared. Note that w′k is unimportant for the decoding of wk at the kth receiver.
4) Obtaining the sizes of subcodes {C(k)ik }:
Here, we shall not use binning but follow the approach of Wyner [7], where random code partitioning is
used. We shall show how to obtain logL′k in the encoding of Wk , for k = 2, ...,K − 1. Following the same
routine, logL′1 and logL′K can be obtained easily, and thus these calculations will be omitted.
To start with, suppose that we have the messages, wk = ik, . . . , wK = iK . We now define
q
(k)
ik
, Pr {Wk = ik|Wk+1 = ik+1, . . . ,WK = iK}
= Pr
{
Wk = ik|uK(iK , i
′
K),uK−1(iK−1, i
′
K−1, iK , i
′
K), . . . ,uk(ik, i
′
k, . . . , iK , i
′
K)
}
.
(15)
The codeword uk(w′′k , . . . , w′′K) is a channel code for pYk|X and pZ|X simultaneously and is comprised of
Lk = 2
nRk subcodes {C(k)ik }
Lk
ik=1
. Uk is an uniformly randomly chosen member of {C(k)ik }. Therefore,
Pr
{
Uk = uk(w
′′
k , . . . , w
′′
K)|uK(iK , i
′
K), . . . ,uk+1(ik+1, i
′
k+1, . . . , iK , i
′
K)
}
=
q
(k)
ik
L′k
. (16)
The codeword uk(w′′k , . . . , w′′K) is a channel code for pYk|X with prior distribution on codewords given by
(16). Each of C(k)ik is a channel code for the wiretap channel pZ|X with L′k codewords and uniform prior
distribution on the codewords. Let λ(k)ik be the error probability for C
(k)
ik
with an optimal decoder, when i′k
is chosen as the index for the codeword from C(k)ik . Then λ¯
(k) is the average error probability for C(k)ik with
an optimal decoder, averaged over the probability that Wk = ik is sent given the previous messages were
Wk+1 = ik+1, . . .WK = iK . As a result, we have

λ
(k)
ik
= Pr
{
X 6= Z|Wk = ik,uK(iK , i
′
K), . . . ,uk+1(ik+1, i
′
k+1, . . . , iK , i
′
K)
}
,
λ¯(k) =
Lk∑
ik=1
q
(k)
ik
λ
(k)
ik
.
(17)
By Fano’s inequality,
H(X|Z,Wk = ik,uK(iK , i
′
K), . . . ,uk+1(ik+1, i
′
k+1, . . . , iK , i
′
K)) ≤ 1 + λ
(k)
ik
logL′k
⇒ H(Uk|Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Wk = ik) ≤ 1 + λ
(k)
ik
logL′k.
(18)
Since |C(k)ik | = L
′
k and has probability of error λ
(k)
ik
, we have
I(Uk;Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Wk = ik) = H(Uk|UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Wk = ik)−H(Uk|Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Wk = ik)
= logL′k −H(Uk|Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Wk = ik)
⇒ logL′k ≤ I(Uk;Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Wk = ik) + 1 + λ
(k)
ik
logL′k.
(19)
7Averaging over ik using {q(k)ik } gives
logL′k ≤ I(Uk;Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Wk) + 1 + λ¯
(k) logL′k
(a)
≤ I(Uk;Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1) + 1 + λ¯
(k) logL′k
(b)
≤ nI(Uk;Z|UK , . . . , Uk+1) + nδ + 1 + λ¯
(k) logL′k,
(c)
= nI(Uk;Z|Uk+1) + nδ + 1 + λ¯
(k) logL′k,
(20)
where (a) is by Wk → (UK , . . . ,Uk+1)→ Uk → Z, (b) results from the fact that (following Liu et al. [8])
I(Uk;Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1) ≤ nI(Uk;Z|UK , . . . , Uk+1) + nδ, (21)
with δ → 0 as n → ∞ and (c) is by the Markov chain condition UK → · · · → Uk+1 → Uk → Z for the
degraded BC. Similarly, by substituting X for U1 and removing conditioning from (15) for k = K , we have

logL1 ≤ nI(X ;Z|U2) + nδ + 1 + λ¯
(1) logL′1,
logLK ≤ nI(UK ;Z) + nδ + 1 + λ¯
(K) logL′K .
(22)
Based on the above, and since R′k = 1n logL
′
k, we let

R′1 , I(X ;Z|U2)− τ,
R′k , I(Uk;Z|Uk+1)− τ, for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1,
R′K , I(UK ;Z)− τ,
(23)
where τ → 0 for sufficiently large n.
5) Probability of error analysis:
We follow the method by Cover and Thomas in [15], and provide the analysis for the kth receiver. Assume
without loss of generality that (W1, . . . ,Wk) = (1, . . . , 1) is sent and w′k = 1 is sent for the subcodes C
(k)
ik
∀k.
At the kth receiver, define the following events (and their complements denoted by the superscript c):

E
(Yk)
iK ,i
′
K
=
{
(UK(iK , i
′
K),Yk) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
}
E
(Yk)
iK ,i
′
K
,iK−1,i
′
K−1
=
{
(UK(iK , i
′
K),UK−1(iK , i
′
K , iK−1, i
′
K−1),Yk) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
}
.
.
.
E
(Yk)
iK ,i
′
K
,...,ik,i
′
k
=
{
(UK(iK , i
′
K), . . . ,Uk(iK , i
′
K , . . . , ik, i
′
k),Yk) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
}
.
(24)
Then, by the union of events bound, we have
P (n)e (k) ≤ Pr
{(
E
(Yk)
1,1
)
c
}
+ Pr
{(
E
(Yk)
1,1,1,1
)
c
}
+ · · ·+ Pr
{(
E
(Yk)
1,1,...,1,1
)
c
}
+∑
iK,i
′
K
iK 6=1
Pr
{(
E
(Yk)
iK ,i
′
K
)
c
}
+
∑
iK−1,i
′
K−1
iK−1 6=1
Pr
{(
E
(Yk)
1,1,iK−1,i′K−1
)
c
}
+ · · ·+
∑
ik,i
′
k
ik 6=1
Pr
{(
E
(Yk)
1,1,...,ik,i′k
)
c
}
, (25)
where there are (K − k + 1) terms in each of the first and second lines of the inequality (25) above; the
last term in the first line of (25) refers to the probability that the complement of the event that the 2k-length
8vector of all ones (1, 1, . . . , 1, 1) occurred; and the last term in the second line of (25) refers to the probability
that the event that the 2k-length vector (1, 1, . . . , ik, i′k) occurred. For the first two terms of (25), we have


Pr
{
E
(Y1)
iK ,i
′
K
}
≤ 2−n(I(UK ;Yk)−3ǫ),
Pr
{
E
(Y1)
1,1,iK−1,i′K−1
}
≤ 2−n(I(UK−1;Yk|UK)−4ǫ).
(26)
Denoting the event {(UK , . . . ,Uk,Yk) ∈ A(n)ǫ } as E˜(Yk), the kth term can be written as
Pr
{(
E
(Yk)
1,1,...,ik,i′k
)
c
}
= Pr
{
(UK(1, 1),UK−1(1, 1, 1, 1), . . . ,Uk(1, 1, . . . , ik, i
′
k),Yk) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
}
=
∑
E˜
(Yk)
Pr {(UK(1, 1),UK−1(1, 1, 1, 1), . . . ,Uk(1, 1, . . . , ik, i
′
k),Yk)}
=
∑
E˜
(Yk)


Pr {UK(1, 1)}Pr {UK−1(1, 1, 1, 1)|UK(1, 1)} × · · · ×
Pr
{
Uk(1, 1, . . . , ik, i
′
k)|UK(1, 1),UK−1(1, 1, 1, 1), . . . ,Uk+1(
2(k+1) terms︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, . . . , 1, 1)
}
×
Pr
{
Yk|UK(1, 1),UK−1(1, 1, 1, 1), . . . ,Uk+1(
2(k+1) terms︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, . . . , 1, 1)
}


≤
∑
E˜
(Yk)
2−n(H(UK)−ǫ)2−n(H(UK−1|UK)−ǫ) × · · · × 2−n(H(Uk|UK ,...,Uk+1)−ǫ)2−n(H(Yk|UK ,...,Uk+1)−ǫ)
≤ 2n(H(UK ,...,Uk+1,Uk,Yk)+ǫ)2−n(H(UK)−ǫ)2−n(H(UK−1|UK)−ǫ)
× · · · × 2−n(H(Uk|UK ,...,Uk+1)−ǫ)2−n(H(Yk|UK ,...,Uk+1)−ǫ)
= 2−n(H(Yk|UK ,...,Uk+1)−H(Yk|UK ,...,Uk+1,Uk)−(k+2)ǫ) = 2−n(I(Yk;Uk|UK ,...,Uk+1)−(k+2)ǫ).
As a result,
P (n)e (k) ≤ (K − k + 1)ǫ+ 2
n(RK+R
′
K)2−n(I(UK ;Yk)−3ǫ) + 2n(RK−1+R
′
K−1)2−n(I(UK−1;Yk|UK)−4ǫ)
+ · · ·+ 2n(Rk+R
′
k)2−n(I(Yk;Uk|UK ,...,Uk+1)−(k+2)ǫ) ≤ 2(K − k + 1)ǫ, for n sufficiently large and (27)
RK +R
′
K < I(UK ;Yk), (28a)
RK−1 +R
′
K−1 < I(UK−1;Yk|UK), (28b)
.
.
.
Rk +R
′
k < I(Uk;Yk|UK , . . . , Uk+1). (28c)
Since I(UK ;Yk) ≥ I(UK ;Yk+1) ≥ · · · ≥ I(UK ;YK) and similarly I(Uk+1;Yk|UK , . . . , Uk+2) ≥ · · · ≥
9I(Uk+1;Yk+1|UK , . . . , Uk+2) by the degraded nature of the channel, from (28a), we get
RK +R
′
K ≤ I(UK ;YK), (29a)
RK−1 +R
′
K−1 ≤ I(UK−1;YK−1|UK), (29b)
.
.
.
Rk +R
′
k ≤ I(Uk;Yk|UK , . . . Uk+1), (29c)
for the second to the last terms in (27) to be ≤ ǫ. Then, as we have the condition UK → UK−1 → · · · →
Uk+1 → Uk → Yk, we have
RK +R
′
K ≤ I(UK ;YK), (30a)
RK−1 +R
′
K−1 ≤ I(UK−1;YK−1|UK), (30b)
.
.
.
Rk +R
′
k ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk+1). (30c)
Following the same approach, for the first receiver, we can get the above inequalities in (30), as well as
R1 +R
′
1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U2). (31)
Therefore, for all the receivers, given the previous definitions for R′1, . . . , R′K in (23), it can be seen that the
probability of error at each receiver satisfies P (n)e (k) ≤ 2(K − k + 1)ǫ for k = 1, . . . ,K and for any rate
tuple (R1, . . . , RK) satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1.
Thus, the direct part of Theorem 1 is proved.
B. Equivocation Calculation
We show the calculation for the kth receiver Re(k) for k = 1, . . . ,K , Re(k,k+1) for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, and the
sum rate Re(1,...,K). We shall make use of the relation
H(U, V ) = H(U) +H(V |U). (32)
For the kth receiver, k = 2, . . . ,K − 1, we have
nRe(k) = H(Wk|Z)
≥ H(Wk|Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1) since conditioning reduces entropy
= H(Wk,Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1)−H(Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1) by (32)
(a)
= H(Wk,Uk,Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1)−H(Uk|Wk,Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1)−H(Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1)
(b)
= H(Wk,Uk|UK , . . . ,Uk+1) +H(Z|Wk,UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Uk)−H(Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1)
−H(Uk|Wk,Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1)
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(c)
≥ H(Uk|UK , . . . ,Uk+1) +H(Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1,Uk)−H(Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1)
−H(Uk|Wk,Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1)
= H(Uk|UK , . . . ,Uk+1)− I(Uk;Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1)−H(Uk|Wk,Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1), (33)
where (a) and (b) have the first two terms by (32), and (c) has the first term by (32) and the second term by the
fact that Wk → (UK , . . . ,Uk+1) → Z. We now bound each of the terms in the last line of (33). For the first
term, given that UK = uK , UK−1 = uK−1, . . . ,Uk+1 = uk+1, uk has 2n(Rk+R
′
k) possible values with equal
probability. As a consequence, we have
H(Uk|UK , . . . ,Uk+1) = n(Rk +R
′
k). (34)
For the second term, it can be shown that
I(Uk;Z|UK , . . . ,Uk+1) ≤ nI(Uk;Z|Uk+1) + nδ. (35)
For the last term, we have by Fano’s inequality
1
n
H(Uk|Wk,Z,UK , . . . ,Uk+1) ≤
1
n
(
1 + λ¯(k) logL′k
)
, ǫ′k,n (36)
where ǫ′k,n → 0 for n sufficiently large.
To show that λ¯(k) → 0 for n sufficiently large so that (36) holds, we consider decoding at the wiretapper and
focus on the codebook with rate R′k to be decoded at the wiretapper with error probability λ¯(k). Let Wk = ik be
fixed. The wiretapper attempts to decode uk given wk,uK , . . . ,uk+1 by finding the estimate for w′k, wˆ′k, so that
(uk(wk, wˆ
′
k, wk+1, w
′
k+1, . . . , wK , w
′
K), z) ∈ A
n
ǫ (PUkZ|Uk+1...UK ). (37)
where wk , and all wk+1, w′k+1, . . . , wK , w′K are known. If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an
error is declared. Defining the event
E
(Z)
i′
k
,
{
(Uk(ik, i
′
k),Z) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PUkZ|Uk+1...UK )
}
, (38)
and assuming without loss of generality that w′k = 1 is sent, we then have
λ¯(k) ≤ Pr
{(
E
(Z)
1
)
c
}
+
∑
i′
k
6=1
Pr
{(
E
(Z)
i′
k
)}
≤ ǫ+ 2nR
′
k2−n(I(Uk;Z|Uk+1,...,UK)−2ǫ), (39)
where ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. Since we have chosen from (23) that R′k = I(Uk|Z|Uk+1) − τ which is
= I(Uk|Z|Uk+1, . . . , UK) − τ by UK → · · · → Uk+1 → Uk → Z , we have λ¯(k) ≤ 2ǫ, for τ > 2ǫ. Thus, λ¯(k) is
small for n sufficiently large and (36) holds.
Now substituting (34)–(36) into the last line of (33), we have
nRe(k) ≥ nRk + nI(Uk;Z|Uk+1)− nτ − nI(Uk;Z|Uk+1)− nδ − nǫ
′
k,n
= nRk − nǫk
(40)
where ǫk = τ + δ+ ǫ′k,n. Hence, the security condition in (8) is satisfied for the kth receiver. For the first receiver,
we condition on UK , . . . ,U2 in the second line of the chain of inequalities above, while for the Kth receiver, we
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can omit the second line of the chain of inequalities in (33) above, while subsequently not performing additional
conditioning in (33). The equivocation rates for the first receiver and the Kth receiver will have the same form as
(40) above with k = 1 and k = K .
We next show the equivocation rates for adjacent receivers k, k+1 for k = 1, . . . ,K−1. Due to the nature of the
coding, equivocation rates for non-adjacent receivers are not achievable. We also assume that, for the equivocation
rate for any two adjacent receivers k, k+1 for k = 1, . . . ,K− 1 to be achievable, the (k+1)th receiver must have
knowledge of uk+2, . . . ,uK . Then, we have
nRe(k,k+1) = H(Wk,Wk+1|Z)
≥ H(Wk,Wk+1|Z,Uk+2, . . . ,UK) since conditioning reduces entropy
= H(Wk,Wk+1,Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK)−H(Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) by (32)
(a)
= H(Wk,Wk+1,Uk,Uk+1,Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK)−H(Uk,Uk+1|Wk,Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z)
−H(Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK)
(b)
= H(Wk,Wk+1,Uk,Uk+1|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) +H(Z|Wk,Wk+1,Uk,Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK) (41)
−H(Uk,Uk+1|Wk,Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z)−H(Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK)
(c)
≥ H(Uk,Uk+1|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) +H(Z|Uk,Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK)−H(Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK)
−H(Uk,Uk+1|Wk,Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z)
(d)
= H(Uk+1|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) +H(Uk|Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK)
+ [H(Z|Uk,Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK)−H(Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK)]−H(Uk,Uk+1|Wk,Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z)
= H(Uk+1|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) +H(Uk|Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK)− I(Uk,Uk+1;Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK)
−H(Uk,Uk+1|Wk,Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z),
where (a), (b) and (d) have the first two terms by (32), and (c) has the first term by (32) and the second term by
(Wk,Wk+1)→ (UkUk+1Uk+2 · · ·UK)→ Z.
We now bound each of the terms in the last line of (41). For the first term, given Uk+2 = uk+2, . . . ,UK = uK ,
uk+1 has 2n(Rk+1+R
′
k+1) possible values with equal probability. For the second term, given Uk+1 = uk+1, . . . ,UK =
uK , uk has 2n(Rk+R
′
k) possible values with equal probability. Therefore, we have

H(Uk+1|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) = n(Rk+1 +R
′
k+1),
H(Uk|Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK) = n(Rk +R
′
k).
(42)
For the third term, it can be shown that
I(Uk,Uk+1;Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) = I(Uk+1;Z|Uk+2, . . . ,UK) + I(Uk;Z|Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK),
≤ nI(Uk+1;Z|Uk+2) + nI(Uk;Z|Uk+1) + 2nδ.
(43)
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For the last term, we have
H(Uk,Uk+1|Wk,Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z)
= H(Uk+1|Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z) +H(Uk|Wk,Wk+1,Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z)
≤ H(Uk+1|Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z) +H(Uk|Wk,Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z),
(44)
where the first equality is because of the fact that Wk and Uk+1 are independent, and the last line is by conditioning
reducing entropy. From the last line of (44), by Fano’s inequality, we have

1
n
H(Uk+1|Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z) ≤
1
n
(
1 + λ¯(k+1) logL′k+1
)
, ǫ′k+1,n,
1
n
H(Uk|Wk,Uk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z) ≤
1
n
(
1 + λ¯(k) logL′k
)
, ǫ′k,n,
(45)
where ǫ′k,n, ǫ′k+1,n → 0 for n sufficiently large. We need to show that λ¯(k+1) is small for n sufficiently large so that
(45) holds, as we already have shown that λ¯(k) is small for n sufficiently large. We consider the situation where
the wiretapper attempts to decode Uk+1 given Wk+1 by joint typicality. Then, following the same procedure to
calculate λ¯(k) in (39) above, we have
λ¯(k+1) ≤ ǫ+ 2nR
′
k+12−n(I(Uk+1;Z|Uk+2,...,UK)−2ǫ). (46)
Since we have selected R′k+1 = I(Uk+1;Z|Uk+2)−τ = I(Uk+1;Z|Uk+2, . . . , UK)−τ , then λ¯(k+1) ≤ ǫ for τ > 2ǫ
and where ǫ→ 0 for n sufficiently large. As a consequence, in (45), both λ¯(k), λ¯(k+1) are small for n sufficiently
large and (45) holds and we have
1
n
H(Uk+1|Wk+1,Uk+2, . . . ,UK ,Z) ≤ ǫ
′
k+1,n + ǫ
′
k,n. (47)
Then, substituting (42), (43) and (47) into the last line of (41), and given R′k+1 and R′k in (23), we have
nRe(k,k+1) ≥ nRk + nRk+1 − ǫk,k+1, (48)
where ǫk,k+1 = 2τ +2δ+ ǫ′k+1,n+ ǫ′k,n, and so security condition (8) is shown. We note that to show equivocation
rates for the pair k = 1, 2, this can be done by following the proof above, but replacing U1 by X.
Lastly, we show the proof for the equivocation sum rate Re(1,...,K). We have
nRe(1,...,K) = H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z)
= H(W1, . . . ,WK ,Z)−H(Z) by (32)
(a)
= H(W1, . . . ,WK ,U2, . . . ,UK ,X,Z)−H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X|W1, . . . ,WK ,Z)−H(Z)
(b)
= H(W1, . . . ,WK ,U2, . . . ,UK ,X) +H(Z|W1, . . . ,WK ,U2, . . . ,UK ,X)
−H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X|W1, . . . ,WK ,Z)−H(Z)
(c)
≥ H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X) +H(Z|U2, . . . ,UK ,X)−H(Z)−H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X|W1, . . . ,WK ,Z)
(d)
= H(UK) +H(UK−1|UK) + · · ·+H(X|U2, . . . ,UK) + [H(Z|U2, . . . ,UK ,X)−H(Z)]
−H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X|W1, . . . ,WK ,Z)
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= H(UK) +H(UK−1|UK) + · · ·+H(X|U2, . . . ,UK)− I(U2, . . . ,UK ,X;Z)
−H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X|W1, . . . ,WK ,Z), (49)
where (a), (b) and (d) have the first two terms by (32), and (c) has the first term by (32) and the second term by
the fact that (W1 . . . WK)→ (UK . . . U2X)→ Z.
We now bound each of the terms in the last line of (49). For the first term, uK has 2n(RK+R′K) possible values
with equal probability. For the second to the (K − 1)th terms, given the preceding codewords uk+1, . . . ,uK , uk
has 2n(Rk+R′k) possible values with equal probability. For the Kth term, given all the preceding codewords, x has
2n(R1+R
′
1) possible values with equal probability. As such, we have
H(UK) = n(RK +R
′
K), (50a)
H(UK−1|UK) = n(RK−1 +R
′
K−1), (50b)
.
.
.
H(X|U2, . . . ,UK) = n(R1 +R
′
1). (50c)
For the second last term, it can be shown that
I(U2, . . . ,UK ,X;Z) = I(UK ;Z) + I(UK−1;Z|UK) + · · ·+ I(X;Z|U2, . . . ,UK)
≤ nI(UK ;Z) + nI(UK−1;Z|UK) + · · ·+ nI(X ;Z|U2) +Knδ.
(51)
For the last term, we have
H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X|W1, . . . ,WK ,Z) = H(UK |WK ,Z) +H(UK−1|WK−1,WK ,UK ,Z) + · · ·
+H(X|W1, . . . ,WK ,U2, . . . ,UK ,Z)
≤ H(UK |WK ,Z) +H(UK−1|WK−1,UK ,Z) +H(X|W1,U2, . . . ,UK ,Z)
(52)
where the first equality is because of the fact that successively, we have UK and W1, . . . ,WK−1 are independent,
UK−1 and W1, . . . ,WK−2 are independent, and so on, and the last line is by conditioning reducing entropy. Now
by applying Fano’s inequality to each term in the last line of (52), we have

1
n
H(UK |WK ,Z) ≤
1
n
(
1 + λ¯(K) logL′K
)
, ǫ′K,n,
1
n
H(UK−1|WK−1,UK ,Z) ≤
1
n
(
1 + λ¯(K−1) logL′2
)
, ǫ′K−1,n,
.
.
.
1
n
H(X|W1,U2, . . . ,UK ,Z) ≤
1
n
(
1 + λ¯(1) logL′1
)
, ǫ′1,n.
(53)
where ǫ′1,n, . . . , ǫ′K,n → 0 for n sufficiently large. It can be shown that λ¯(1), . . . , λ¯(K) ≤ 2ǫ where ǫ → 0 for
n sufficiently large by considering the wiretapper decoding X, . . . ,UK given the respective associated messages
W1, . . . ,WK and the preceding codewords. This is done using the same method of joint typicality and the choice
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of rates for R′k, k = 1, . . . ,K as shown in the above for the equivocation rates for Re(k) and Re(k,k+1). Thus,
1
n
H(U2, . . . ,UK ,X|W1, . . . ,WK ,Z) ≤
K∑
k=1
ǫ′k,n. (54)
Then by substituting (50a)–(50c), (51) and (54) into the last line of (49), we have, given the definitions for the rate
tuple (R′1, . . . , R′K) in (23),
nRe(1,...,K) ≥ n
K∑
k=1
Rk − ǫ1,...,K , (55)
where ǫ1,...,K = Kτ +Kδ+
∑K
k=1 ǫ
′
k,n and the security conditions in (8) are satisfied. As a result, we have shown
that the equivocation rates in (8) are achievable, and hence the secret rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK).
IV. PROOF OF CONVERSE
Here, we show the converse proof to Theorem 1. Consider a (2nR1 , . . . , 2nRK , n) code with error probability
P
(n)
e with the code construction so that we have the condition (W1 · · · WK) → X → Y1 · · · YKZ. Then, the
probability distribution on W1 × · · · ×WK ×Xn × Yn1 × · · · × YnK ×Zn is given by
p(w1) · · · p(w3)p(x|w1, . . . , wK)
n∏
i=1
p(y1i, . . . , yKi, zi|xi). (56)
In the following, we give the proof for the rate at the kth receiver. We shall also show later that the proof for the
Kth receiver can be easily obtained from this, while the proof for the first receiver requires a few additional steps.
For k = 2, . . . ,K − 1, the rate Rk satisfies
nRk = H(Wk) ≤ H(Wk|Z) + nǫk by secrecy condition
= H(Wk|Z,Wk+1, . . . ,WK) + I(Wk;Wk+1, . . . ,WK |Z) + nǫk
= H(Wk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK)− I(Wk;Z|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) + I(Wk;Wk+1, . . . ,WK |Z) + nǫk
= I(Wk;Yk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) +H(Wk|Yk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK)− I(Wk;Z|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) (57)
+ I(Wk;Wk+1, . . . ,WK |Z) + nǫk
(a)
≤ I(Wk;Yk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK)− I(Wk;Z|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) +H(Wk|Yk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK)
+H(Wk+1|Z) + · · · +H(WK |Z) + nǫk
(b)
≤ I(Wk;Yk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK)− I(Wk;Z|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) + n(δ
′′
k + δ
′
k+1 + · · ·+ δ
′
K + ǫk), (58)
where (a) is by I(Wk;Wk+1, . . . ,WK |Z) ≤ H(Wk+1, . . . ,WK |Z) ≤ H(Wk+1|Z) + · · · +H(WK |Z), and (b) is
by Fano’s inequality which gives

H(Wk|Yk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK) ≤ nRkP
(n)
e + 1 , nδ
′′
k ,
H(Wk+1|Z) ≤ nRk+1P
(n)
e + 1 , nδ
′
k+1,
.
.
.
H(WK |Z) ≤ nRKP
(n)
e + 1 , nδ
′
K ,
(59)
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where δ′′k , δ′k+1, . . . , δ′K → 0 if P
(n)
e → 0.
Expanding the first two terms of (57) by the chain rule gives
I(Wk;Yk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) =
n∑
i=1
I(Wk;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k ), (60a)
I(Wk;Z|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) =
n∑
i=1
I(Wk;Zi|Wk+1, . . . ,WK , Z˜
i+1). (60b)
From (60a), by using the identity I(S1S2;T |V ) = I(S1;T |V ) + I(S2;T |S1V ), we get
I(Wk;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k )
= I(Wk, Z˜
i+1;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k )− I(Z˜
i+1;Yk,i|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
1 )
= I(Wk;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Z˜
i+1) + I(Z˜i+1;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k )
− I(Z˜i+1;Yk,i|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k ).
(61)
Substituting this into (60a) we have,

I(Wk;Yk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) =
n∑
i=1
I(Wk;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Z˜
i+1) + Σk,1 − Σk,2
Σk,1 =
n∑
i=1
I(Z˜i+1;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
1 ),
Σk,2 =
n∑
i=1
I(Z˜i+1;Yk,i|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k ).
(62)
From (60b), again by using I(S1S2;T |V ) = I(S1;T |V ) + I(S2;T |S1V ), and substituting this into (60b), we get

I(Wk;Z|Wk+1, . . . ,WK) =
n∑
i=1
I(Wk;Zi|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Z˜
i+1) + Σ∗k,1 − Σ
∗
k,2
Σ∗k,1 =
n∑
i=1
I(Yi−1k ;Zi|Wk+1, . . . ,WK , Z˜
i+1),
Σ∗k,2 =
n∑
i=1
I(Yi−1k ;Zi|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK , Z˜
i+1).
(63)
It is known by Lemma 7 in [6] that Σk,1 = Σ∗k,1 and Σk,2 = Σ∗k,2. Therefore,
nRk ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Z˜
i+1)− I(Wk;Zi|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Z˜
i+1)
]
+ n(δ′′k + δ
′
k+1 + · · ·+ δ
′
K + ǫk). (64)
The terms under the summation are
I(Wk;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Z˜
i+1)− I(Wk;Zi|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Z˜
i+1)
= H(Wk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Wk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Yk,i, Z˜
i+1)
(a)
≤ H(Wk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Wk|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Yk,i, Zi, Z˜
i+1)
= I(Wk;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
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= H(Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Yk,i|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1) (65)
= H(Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k ,Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
+ I(Yk,i;Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K |Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
−H(Yk,i|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
(b)
= H(Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k ,Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K , Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Yk,i|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
(c)
≤ H(Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K , Zi, Z˜
i+1)−H(Yk,i|Wk,Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k ,Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
= I(Wk,Y
i−1
k ;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K , Zi, Z˜
i+1),
where (a) and (c) are due to conditioning reducing entropy, and (b) is due to the fact that
I(Yk,i;Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K |Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k , Zi, Z˜
i+1) = 0, (66)
since Yi−1k+1 · · · Y
i−1
K →Wk+1 · · · WK → Y
i−1
k ZiZ˜
i+1 → Yk,i. Now, define the random variables

UK,i ,WKY
i−1
K Z˜
i+1,
Uk,i ,WkY
i−1
k , for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1,
(67)
and we have the condition
UK,i → · · · → Uk,i → Xi → Yk,i · · · YK,i → Zi. (68)
We note that our choice of auxiliary random variables is different from Bagherikaram et al., which deals with the
2-receiver degraded BC with an external wiretapper [10], and from [12], which studies the K-receiver degraded
BC with a common message and an external wiretapper. The choice is also different, due to the presence of
the wiretapper, from that of Borade et al. in [13] which deals with the K-receiver degraded BC without secrecy
conditions. Thus, we have
I(Wk,Y
i−1
k ;Yk,i|Wk+1, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
k+1, . . . ,Y
i−1
K , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
= I(Uk,i;Yk,i|U(k+1),i, . . . , UK,i, Zi)
(a)
= I(Uk,i;Yk,i|U(k+1),i, Zi)
= I(Uk,i;Yk,i, Zi|U(k+1),i)− I(Uk,i;Zi|U(k+1),i)
= I(Uk,i;Yk,i|U(k+1),i) + I(Uk,i;Zi|U(k+1),i)− I(Uk,i;Zi|U(k+1),i)
(b)
= I(Uk,i;Yk,i|U(k+1),i)− I(Uk,i;Zi|U(k+1),i),
(69)
where (a) is due to the condition (68), and (b) is due to I(Uk,i;Zi|U(k+1),i) = 0 since we have Uk,i → U(k+1),i →
Zi. As a result, we have
nRk ≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uk,i;Yk,i|U(k+1),i)− I(Uk,i;Zi|U(k+1),i)
]
+ n(δ′′k + δ
′
k+1 + · · ·+ δ
′
K + ǫk). (70)
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To show the converse for R1, we follow the same steps as above, but additionally we use (65) with k = 1 to
arrive at the equivalent chain of equalities (69) above for k = 1. From the last line of (65), substituting for the
random variables U2,i, . . . , UK,i, we then have
I(W1,Y
i−1
1 ;Y1,i|W2, . . . ,WK ,Y
i−1
2 , . . . ,Y
i−1
K , Zi, Z˜
i+1)
= I(W1,Y
i−1
1 ;Y1,i|U2,i, . . . , UK,i, Zi)
= I(W1;Y1,i|U2,i, . . . , UK,i, Zi) + I(Y
i−1
1 ;Y1,i|W1, U2,i, . . . , UK,i, Zi)
(a)
= I(W1;Y1,i|U2,i, . . . , UK,i, Zi)
(b)
≤ I(Xi;Y1,i|U2,i, Zi)
= I(Xi;Y1,i, Zi|U2,i)− I(Xi;Zi|U2,i)
= I(Xi;Y1,i|U2,i) + I(Xi;Zi|U2,i, Y1,i)− I(Xi;Zi|U2,i)
(c)
= I(Xi;Y1,i|U2,i)− I(Xi;Zi|U2,i)
(71)
where (a) is by the second term I(Yi−11 ;Y1,i|W1, U2,i, . . . , UK,i, Zi) = 0 since Yi−11 → W1U2,i · · · UK,iZi →
Y1,i, (b) is by Y1,i → Xi →W1 and by the Markov condition (68), and (c) is by the second term I(Xi;Zi|U2,i, Y1,i) =
0 since Xi → U2,iY1,i → Zi. Thus, we have
nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(Xi;Y1,i|U2,i)− I(Xi;Zi|U2,i)] + n(δ
′′
1 + δ
′
2 + · · ·+ δ
′
K + ǫ1). (72)
The proof for RK is easily obtained using the above approach, only without conditioning on Wk+1, . . . ,WK in
the second line of (57). This results in
nRK ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(UK,i;YK,i)− I(UK,i;Zi)] + n(δ
′′
K + ǫK). (73)
Now, we introduce the random variable G, which is uniformly distributed among the integers {1, 2, . . . , n} and
is independent of all other random variables. Define the following auxiliary random variables
UK = (G,UK,G), (74a)
UK−1 = (G,UK−1,G), (74b)
.
.
.
X = XG, (74c)
Y1 = Y1,G, (74d)
.
.
.
YK = YK,G, (74e)
Z = ZG. (74f)
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Then (70), (72), (73) become
RK ≤ I(UK ;YK)− I(UK ;Z), (75a)
Rk ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk+1)− I(Uk;Z|Uk+1), for k = 2, . . . ,K − 1, (75b)
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U2)− I(X ;Z|U2), (75c)
and the converse to Theorem 1 is proved.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new secrecy capacity region for the degraded K-receiver BC with private messages in the
presence of a wiretapper which generalizes previous work which dealt with 2-receiver BCs. In the direct proof we
have used superposition coding and Wyner’s random code partitioning instead of binning to show the achievable
rate tuples. We have provided error probability analysis and equivocation calculation for the general kth receiver.
In the converse proof we have used a new definition for the auxiliary random variables which is different from
either the 2-receiver BC with a wiretapper, or the more recently studied K-receiver BC with common message and
wiretapper, or the K-receiver BC without wiretapper cases.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Liang and H. Poor, “Multiple-access channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 976–1002,
Mar. 2008.
[2] L. Lai and H. E. Gamal, “The relay-eavesdropper channel: Cooperation for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 54, no. 9, pp.
4005–4019, Sep. 2008.
[3] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6,
pp. 2515–2534, Jun. 2008.
[4] Y. Liang, H. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secure communication over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2470–2492,
Jun. 2008.
[5] R. Liu and H. Poor, “Secrecy capacity region of a multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans.
Info. Theory, submitted for publication, Sep. 2007.
[6] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, Mar.
1978.
[7] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[8] R. Liu, I. Maric´, P. Spasojevic´, and R. Yates, “Discrete memoryless interference and broadcast channels with confidential messages: Secrecy
rate regions,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2493–2507, Jun. 2008.
[9] J. Xu, Y. Cao, and B. Chen, “Capacity bounds for broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, submitted
for publication, May 2008.
[10] G. Bagherikaram, A. S. Motahari, and A. K. Khandani, “Secrecy rate region of the broadcast channel,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, submitted
for publication, Jul. 2008.
[11] L. C. Choo and K. K. Wong, “Three-receiver broadcast channel with confidential messages,” IEEE Info. Theory Workshop, ITW 2009,
Volos, Greece, submitted for publication, Dec. 2008.
[12] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “Secrecy capacity of a class of broadcast channels with an eavesdropper,” EURASIP J. Wireless Commun. and
Net., submitted for publication, Dec. 2008.
[13] S. Borade, L. Zheng, and M. Trott, “Multilevel broadcast networks,” in Proc. Int. Sym. Info. Theory, Nice, France, 24–29, 2007, pp.
1151–1155.
19
[14] P. Bergmans, “Random coding theorem for broadcast channels with degraded components,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 19, no. 2, pp.
197–207, Mar. 1973.
[15] T. Cover and J. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2006.
